We present and analyze enforcement data from the European Securities Market Authority over the period following European Union harmonized rule setting on securities market abuse.
Introduction
It is widely regarded that there are important differences in securities laws across countries (La Porta et al., 2006) , just as there are important differences in the enforcement of securities laws across countries (Jackson and Roe, 2009 ). This empirical evidence shows that both the design and enforcement of securities laws have important implications for the success of market activities such as facilitating new listings and other capital raising activities. However, this disparate evidence on rule design versus rule enforcement highlights the fact that we do not know exactly how important the enforcement of securities laws is in the context of a legal environment which has the same set of market abuse rules.
Put differently, in past years what actually constituted market abuse in securities laws has been different across countries, thereby making analyses of what works in detecting market abuse rather intractable. But recently, European Union directives have given rise to harmonized market abuse definitions and rules (Cumming et al., 2011) . The recent release of market abuse 1 Quote from the sentence of the The British Financial Services Authority addressed to UBS AG for manipulations of LIBOR benchmark rates: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/final/ubs.pdf statistics and enforcement data from ESMA (2012) enables a unique setting in which to analyze the importance of enforcement in detecting market abuse cases. This paper represents a first look at such data.
Academic, practitioner and policy literature are extremely consistent in highlighting the importance of analyzing factors that lead to differential detection of market abuse. Frauds harm the integrity of financial markets and hence, an important principle of the mechanism for efficient allocation of financial resources (La Porta et al., 1997 , 1998 Djankov et al., 2008; Horakova and Jordan, 2013) . The 2008 to 2010 LIBOR manipulations, for example, established the biggest fraud activity in European financial markets until today. Record sanctions have been imposed and probably will continue to be charged in the ongoing process of settling all detected fraudulent acts. But despite the benefits of deterring enforcement, there are costs to deterring enforcement (Jackson and Roe, 2009) . In this paper we make use of data to ascertain exactly the marginal benefit of expenditures on additional enforcement activity in respect of improved detection.
Our empirical analysis focuses on fraud in European financial markets. We utilize a unique data set provided by the European Security and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2012) on frauds detected between 2008 and 2010 by the national competent authorities. This data allows us to elaborate on the criteria that affect fraudulent acts and their detection across time and countries.
The data reveal the following. First, increasing the resources of the supervision authorities strongly and consistently supports fraud detection. A 1-standard deviation increase in the number of supervisors (all of the persons who work in the national banking and insurance supervision authorities) is associated with an increase in detected cases by approximately 80% relative to the average number of cases across country-years. Second, differences in enforcement rules pertaining to surveillance give rise to large differences in fraudulent acts. In particular, a 1-standard deviation increase in formalized cooperation agreements across securities across countries is associated with a reduction in fraudulent cases by approximately 40%. Third, differences in enforcement rules pertaining to deterrence also give rise to large differences in fraud. The data indicate that a 1-standard deviation increase in minimum imprisonment is associated with a reduction in fraudulent cases by 38%.
In this paper we examine detected fraud, not actual (unobserved) fraud. There could be differences between detected fraud and actual unobserved fraud across countries due to, for example, differences in national culture. We do not find any robust cultural determinants of detected fraud across countries in our sample. Nevertheless, the data do indicate that countries with more capital market activity are more likely to detected market abuse infringement.
Similarly, the data highlight that the legal quality in a country with respect to the protection of shareholders and lenders mitigates infringement activity. Also, the data suggest that enforcement authorities are more vigorous in detecting and reporting fraud when minimum pecuniary fines are higher.
There are a number of policy implications from our analyses. Legal enforcement of market abuse comes in three primary forms: direct expenditure on enforcement officers, the quality of surveillance through information sharing, and rules pertaining to deterrence. The ESMA data examined herein show each of these three mechanisms pertaining to enforcement is extremely important for detecting and deterring fraud. The data examined reveal effective mechanisms for politicians and regulators to fight fraud in financial markets and to increase investors' confidence in the existence of sound capital markets. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Empirical tests are presented in section 3. Robustness checks are provided in section 4. Concluding remarks and policy implications are discussed in the last section.
Data
Our primary data source is the ESMA (2012) report on the actual use of sanctioning powers under the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). The review panel of the Committee of European Securities Regulators launched a mapping procedure with regard to the actual use of sanctioning powers in the European Union member states in cases of market abuse. This mapping focused primarily on the actual use of sanctions concerning the two main offences of insider dealing and market manipulation. Article 14 of the MAD obliges the European Union member states to ensure that appropriate administrative measures can be taken or administrative sanctions be imposed against the persons responsible. Member states under the existing directive maintain the right (but do not have an obligation) to impose also criminal sanctions.
However, there is no harmonization in this respect.
While the main focus has been on the use of administrative sanctioning powers, information was collected from national competent authorities on administrative sanctions and -to the extent possible -when possible or available on criminal sanctions. Information was obtained through a questionnaire among the national competent authorities covering data for a three-year period (i.e. 2008, 2009 and 2010) . Table 1 lists the 28 countries and their national competent authorities which provided the data used in our analyses.
=================
Insert Table 1 here ================= The ESMA notes that several aspects are important when using their report. Most importantly, the legal framework and powers available for the competent authorities to deal with market abuse differ among the European countries. These differences include the relationships between the competent authorities and judicial authorities in implementing the provisions of the MAD. Certain judicial authorities might be, in addition to courts, the prosecutors in some countries. Moreover, the report relies on information provided by the national competent authorities but sanctions decisions by judicial authorities might not be easily available for them. Further, administrative and criminal procedures cover the whole chain of market abuse sanctioning. They start with the daily business of the competent authorities to observe and identify abnormal market moves, through the opening of an investigation, until the pronouncing of a sanction. This sanction may be reviewed or appealed, and it can take a substantial amount of time until the process is finally settled. All this information might not be directly available for the competent authority.
Additionally, the national competent authorities have different powers with respect to market abuse sanctioning. The major difference is that some of them have administrative and/or criminal proceedings at their disposal and can apply them directly to natural and legal persons while others don't have these powers and therefore only assist the judicial authorities. The practice also differs in terms of publication of administrative and criminal sanction decisions.
Finally, in those member states where the competent authorities have direct sanctioning power, the exchange of information may be an obligation on both the competent and judicial authorities. In other cases, the competent authority has an obligation to keep the judicial authorities informed. While, still in others it is the judicial authorities that have such an obligation towards the national competent authority.
Since it is not always evident which authority finally has the sanctioning power on market abuse, we collect both, the number of natural or legal persons who are either directly sanctioned or discharged for insider dealing or market manipulation by the competent authorities and the cases that have been transferred to a judicial authority. Independently of which authority has the proceedings at its disposal all these offenses were detected by the competent authority. We use the numbers of direct sanctions and discharges by the competent authorities over the three years of observation (2008, 2009 and 2010) Table 2 gives rise to some preliminary observations. Germany, as the largest European country has the highest number of detected offenses while Sweden, as a medium size country (in terms of GDP and population) in our sample has the most cases transmitted. In any way, not the size of the economy or population but of the financial market should affect the data because only the capital markets provide the "room for infringements". We would assume that the number of listed companies or the trading volume may have a direct impact on offenses as well as the number of staff that is dedicated to dealing with market abuse.
The Table also reveals that the Swedish competent authority has no option for administrative or criminal sanctions and has to direct all detected cases to the judicial authorities. This is similarly the case for Denmark. Nevertheless, the Danish competent authority cooperates very closely with its judicial authority. Most other competent authorities transfer some of their detected offenses to judicial authorities for prosecution. This might even be in addition to already having sanctioned or discharged them. Additionally, several natural or legal persons may be involved in a case which has been transferred to a judicial authority. Therefore, and to avoid any possibility of double counting of individual fraud incidents, we treat both variables separately and focus on the left hand side variable "Detected Offenses" while we use "Transmitted Cases" only for robustness checks. As argued in the previous section, our main variable of interest should be affected by several socio-economic parameters. The most important factor for fraud detection in an international comparison is probably the resources of the competent authorities in terms of budget and staffing. Unfortunately, the ESMA report does not provide such information and it is likewise not publicly available. Therefore, we retrieve the number of total staff of banking and insurance supervisors and regulators for our sample countries from Horáková and Jordan (2013) as a proxy. The national competent authorities are usually direct subsidiaries of the banking and insurance regulators. Even if a large fraction of the staff of these institutions is not in charge of detecting insider transactions or market manipulation we expect at least a high correlation and similar ratios across countries between their overall staff and the number of employees dedicated to financial market supervision. Table 3 reports these numbers for the respective period.
Insert Table 3 here ================= Beside this most important parameter for fraud detection, we collect several control variables for the size and for the capital market activity of our sample countries. Table 4 presents authorities. We assume that formalized cooperation increases the administrational efficiency to sanction the detected offenses. This might increase the awareness of market participants about the work of the supervising authorities and the sanctioning process and hence, reduce the preparedness to commit frauds.
Minimum Imprisonment.
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The report does not provide exact information on the potential jail sentences but only the broad categories no jail time, up to 1 year, and between 2 and 5 years.
Nevertheless, we learn from the report that the minimum length of imprisonment varies from 15 days for Slovenia to two years for Italy, while the maximum length ranges from 30 days for Greece to 15 years in Slovakia. 6 We assume that potential jail sentences pose a strong threat to market participants and hence, lower fraudulent acts.
Publication of Decision is a dummy which equals 1 if administrative or criminal sanction decisions are to be published by law. The publication of charges can be considered a part of the whole sanctioning process because the information about breaches of law is provided to the general public. The affected individuals and institutions do not only suffer from their penalty but also from media attention and a loss of reputation. We expect that this effect dis-encourages potential offenders.
The dummy variable Cooperation also in Later Stages has a value of 1 if the cooperation between the competent and the judicial authority is envisaged to be extended to later stages of the procedure. Cooperation among the two authorities may be desirable to ensure proper pursuing of market abuse. Such cooperation may not only exist to initiate legal procedures but also to provide support in a more or less defined framework until the case is settled. Several of the competent authorities do not only cooperate in the beginning of the process. They also 5 Source: ESMA (2012) report, Table G 29.2 6 Note: For consistency, we always use the upper levels of these distinct groups in our analyses. Unfortunately, the information is only provided by 9 competent authorities. We expect that limitations of penalties have a counterproductive effect on the intention to decrease the number of offenses. Table 6 lists, and describes all variables and their sources.
=================
Insert Table 6 here ================= Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics for our variables over 28 sample countries (9 for the Limit on Fines variable) and three years of observations. ================= Insert Table 7 here ================= Table 8 shows the bivariate correlations among the independent variables. ================= Insert Table 8 here
The correlation matrix reveals a low correlation among most paired variables. Nevertheless, the correlation between the two legal indicators is (not unexpectedly) elevated. Additionally, Limits on Fines might cause problems of multicollinearity in regression analyses. Therefore, we carefully develop horse races among the independent variables in the subsequent section.
Regression Analyses
We set up horse races among the independent variables and start with OLS regressions.
However, one might argue that staffing the competent authority is driven by politicians and contingent on perceived fraud activity in a particular country. The higher is the perception of fraud the higher the number of staff which politicians might allocate to the national supervision authorities. This simultaneity might bias our OLS estimates. Furthermore, staffing of the supervision authorities might follow a general pattern or a ratio of administrative employees in the various member states. Larger countries, in terms of their economy or their population employ more administrative staff. Therefore, we have another reason to conjecture that our key independent variable to explain fraud detection "Number of Supervisors" might not be exogenous. To cope with potential endogeneity, we run several additional regressions where we instrument "Number of Supervisors" by GDP and population. We also cluster standard errors by country and use a GMM estimate to eventually increase the quality of our parameter estimates. In a final step, we consider the panel structure of our data and use Random Effects Instrumented Variable Regressions. ================= Insert Table 9 here ================= Table 9 First, increasing the resources of the supervision authorities strongly and consistently supports fraud detection. A 1-standard deviation increase in the number of supervisors is associated with an increase in detected cases by approximately 80% relative to the average number of cases across country-years. Second, differences in enforcement rules pertaining to surveillance give rise to large differences in fraudulent acts.
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In particular, a 1-standard deviation increase in formalized cooperation agreements across securities across countries is associated with a reduction in fraudulent cases by approximately 40%. Third, differences in enforcement rules pertaining to deterrence also give rise to large differences in fraud. The data indicate that a 1-standard deviation increase in minimum imprisonment is associated with a reduction in fraudulent cases by 38%. Table 10 where models (E) and (F) add the two indicators for investor protection separately, and model (G) sets up a horse race among them. Model (H) adds the dummy for the institutionalized cooperation between the competent authority and the judicial authority also in later stages of a prosecution and the dummy if there is a limit on fines. Unfortunately, the latter variable is available for only 9 countries over three years. This explains the reduction in observations but also, surprisingly, a strong increase in the coefficient of determination of regression (H). For the narrowed sample of countries where the information on limits of fines is provided, the results become even stronger than in the previous regressions. One can argue that several outliers are dropped in the reduced sample. All OLS regressions have relatively high coefficients of determination at increasing levels from (A) to (H). The independent variables have expected signs and the economic magnitude for some of them is notable. From Model (G), thus considering the complete sample, we interpret that an increase of staff of the supervision authority by 100 persons improves fraud detection by 3.6 10 Related evidence shows that surveillance is more effective with information sharing (Cumming and Johan, 2008) . cases per year.
============================ Insert
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If there is a formalized cooperation and if the sanction decisions are published, then the dissuasive effects reduce the number of detected offenses by almost 10 cases each year, all else equal (i.e. especially controlling for the number of staff of the competent authority).
Likewise, an increase by 1 point in the Shareholder Suits Index decreases detected infringements by almost 4 cases per year (all else equal). Raising the threat of imprisonment by one year lowers detected frauds by 6 cases per year. From Model (H) we learn that additionally, formalized cooperation between the competent and the judicial authority in later stages obviously increases the efficiency of the processes and dissuades potential offenders. In contrary, limiting the punishment has a negative effect on fraud prevention. We realize that, controlling for all other factors, the amount of detected frauds increases in countries with limits on fines. This must be due to additional infringements compared to those countries with unlimited fines.
In a next step, we elaborate on the assumed endogeneity of our key explanatory variable "Number of Supervisors". The endogenous variable might cause our point estimates to be biased. We argued above that staffing the competent authorities is a political decision which might be proportional to country size. Comparatively, the size of an economy should not affect frauds in financial markets. We would like to recall that there are several rather small European countries in terms of their economy or population with a large capital market activity. The opposite is also true: Some large countries have less developed financial markets. We test this hypothesis by an augmented regression. First, we regress the number of supervisors on a country's GDP and its population to identify if the two variables are appropriate instruments for staffing of the competent authorities. We predict the residuals and then regress our dependent 11 The standard deviation of the "Number of Supervisors" is 753 persons (Table 6) . Therefore, adding 100 people to the supervisory staff is less than one seventh of the variable's standard deviation. We note again that only a smaller fraction of the staff counted by the number of supervisors is directly dedicated to market abuse supervision.
variable "Detected Offenses" on "Number of Supervisors" and the predicted residuals. If the usual test statistics are met and if the regressors are significant, then our key variable of interest is correlated with the error term in the regressions presented above, and therefore endogenous.
=================
Insert Table 11 here   =================   Table 11 presents the augmented regressions to test for endogeneity and to verify the proposed instruments at the same time. The first steps of the augmented regressions AR (A) and (B) reveal that GDP and Population highly correlate with the instrumented variable and therefore serve as appropriate instruments. The second steps of both regressions confirm the endogeneity of the number of supervisors revealing the significant impact of the residuals on the dependent variable. AR (B) further proofs that the financial market activity is not a predictor for the staff of the supervisory institutions. We assume that this is caused by a bureaucratic tendency to create administrational jobs relative to country size rather than relative to the actual size of the financial market. Table 12 here ================= The first model is a two stage least square regression, instrumenting the number of supervisors in the first step (which is not presented) and then adding the additional relevant regressors in the second (which is presented). A Hausman (1978) test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the parameter estimates of this IV regression and of OLS (E) are equal and a Sargan (1958) test confirms that the selected instruments are appropriately uncorrelated with the disturbance process. Therefore, we should prefer the IV approaches compared to OLS.
Nevertheless, the results discussed so far remain in principle. Some of them, e.g. the number of supervisors, become statistically and economically even stronger. The importance of others slightly decreases in particular regressions. The second IV model allows that observations within the individual countries may be correlated and calculates cluster-robust estimates.
Consequently, the standard errors of the point estimates increase compared to the previous model and thus, rejecting the null-hypothesis for the legal quality indicator is impossible. The third model controls for the possibility of a violation of the assumption of i.i.d. errors and determines GMM estimates. The results remain qualitatively unchanged. In the fourth and fifth model, we account for the panel structure of our data and apply instrumented random effects regressions to allow for potentially serially correlated error terms. It could be possible that fraud detection follows a certain pattern over time, eventually driven by new technology. Equivalent to OLS (H), the point estimates in model 5 result from a reduced sample of only 27 observations. The random effects models do not provide major new insights. However, the indicator for the publication of the sanction decision is not a significant driver of the number of detected frauds in the fourth model while this is analogue for the Shareholder Suits Index in model 5.
Summarizing, we note that even if we control for endogeneity and the panel structure of our data, the initial OLS results are qualitatively unchanged but receive additional support by the other econometric approaches that we apply.
Robustness Checks
We recall that our dependent variable is a count variable. It takes small values in many observations, including zero infringements. The fact that for some countries "Detected Offenses" has a value of zero rules out using its logarithm in our analyses. Count variables are non-negative and typically follow a Poisson Distribution. Therefore, a Maximum Likelihood Estimate might be a preferable regression model. We run Poisson Regressions in a robustness check and present the results in Tables 13 and 14.   =======================   Insert Tables 13 and 14 here ======================= The regressions presented in Tables 13 and 14 repeat OLS (A) to (H) from Tables 9 and 10 considering the Poisson Distribution of the regressand. The analyses clearly support our line of argumentation. Taking account for the characteristic of a non-normally distributed dependent variable substantially decreases the standard errors of the regression parameters. All of our revealed drivers of detected infringements become significant at a 1% level.
In a subsequent robustness check, we use the cases transmitted to the judicial authorities as alternative dependent variable. We realize that the observations of transmitted cases for Sweden might be flawed relative to its size of the economy or population and also with respect to any measure of its capital market activity. We emphasize that Sweden transmitted in 2008 five times the number of detected frauds of Germany and 15 times the number of France to its judicial authority. On the other side, the Swedish competent authority has no autonomy to proceed and sanction infringements independently and is required to transfer all cases.
Denmark and Poland also stand out with their numbers of transmitted cases. However, ESMA (2012) notes that these numbers rather reflect the diversity existing in the national legal systems for the transmission of information to the judicial authorities. For example, in some countries every observation of potential misconduct might trigger a transmission of the case while in others the competent authorities might collect sufficient proof first, prior to transferring the observation of an incident. In any case, we consider Sweden an outlier with respect to its number of transmitted cases. Without Sweden, the variance of the variable becomes rather small. Additionally, it takes zero values for many observations. Hence, the detection of significant covariates is less likely for the alternative dependent variable. This presumption is revealed in the results presented in Table 15.   =================   Insert Table 15 here ================= Table 15 shows the results of three robustness checks. We rerun OLS (G) and (H) from Table 10 and the instrumented random effects regression (B) from Table 11 , dropping Sweden from the sample and using the alternative dependent variable. As presumed, several covariates can no longer be considered significant. However, reducing the sample via the inclusion of the variables on the cooperation at later stages and for measuring fines yields significance again for the parameters we already discussed above.
We conclude that our results hold with respect to non-normality of the dependent variable and under the consideration of differences in the legalities related to the transfer of incidences to the judicial authorities.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented and analyzed enforcement data from the European Securities Market Authority. Prior to the European Union's harmonized rule setting on securities market abuse, there was no consistent definition of what actually constituted market abuse across countries. In this new era of harmonized market abuse definitions and rules across countries, it is possible to ascertain factors that materially affect market abuse across countries.
The empirical tests are highly consistent with the view that the intensity of enforcement is the most statistically robust and economically significant predictor of market abuse detections. In particular, the data identify three important arms of enforcement. First, the 20 number of supervisors is an important mechanism to facilitate detection of market abuse. The data indicate that this direct expenditure on supervisors is most statistically and economically tied to detecting market abuse. Second, formalized cooperation is an important tool through which securities market authorities can effectively engage in surveillance of market abuse.
Finally, the data highlight the important of imprisonment (not fines) to deter would-be market manipulators.
As additional years of data become available, further research could examine the stability of our findings in different market conditions. Further research could also examine case-specific data, as they become available, in respect of the severity and types of market abuse. These and related studies would shed further light on international differences in securities fraud and appropriate mechanisms to detect and deter such market manipulation. considered in our analyses. Malta which is also included in the ESMA survey has been dropped from our sample due to the lack of availability of the required other data series that we use in the course of our analyses. Slovenia  0  3  9  1  2  2  Spain  6  2  19  1  0  10  Sweden  0  0  0  304  262  249  United Kingdom  7  10  21  0  0  0  Total  454  494  537  483  485  480  This Table presents 
